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Abstract
Background: There are serious safety risks associated with chemotherapy, often associated with interdependencies
in regimens administered over months or years. Various strategies are used to manage these risks. Computerized
provider order entry (CPOE) systems are also implemented to improve medication safety. Little is known regarding
the effect of CPOE on how clinicians manage chemotherapy interdependencies and their associated safety
strategies.
Methods: We conducted a multi-method qualitative study in a paediatric hospital. We analysed 827 oncology
incidents reported following CPOE implementation and carried out semi-structured interviews with doctors (n = 10),
nurses (n = 6), a pharmacist, and oncology CPOE team members (n = 2). Results were interpreted according to
safety models (ultra-safe, high-reliability organisations [HROs], or ultra-adaptive).
Results: Incident reports highlighted two interrelated types of interdependencies: those within organisation of
clinical activities and those inherent in chemotherapy regimens. Clinicians reported strategies to address
chemotherapy risks and interdependencies. These included rigid rules and ‘no go’ contexts for treatment to
proceed, typical of the ultra-safe model; use of time (e.g. planning only so far ahead) and sensitivity to operations,
typical of HROs. We identified three different time horizons in CPOE use in relation to patients’ treatments: life-long,
the whole regimen, and the ‘here and now’. CPOE supported ultra-safe strategies through automation and access
to rules/standardisation, but also created difficulties and contributed to incidents. It supported the ‘here and now’
better than a life-long or whole regimen view of a patient treatment. Sensitivity to operations was essential to
anticipate and resolve uncertainties, hazards, CPOE limitations, and mismatches between CPOE processes and
workflow in practice.
(Continued on next page)
© The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the
data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
* Correspondence: v.lichtner@ucl.ac.uk; valentina.lichtner@mq.edu.au
1Australian Institute of Health Innovation, Faculty of Medicine, Health and
Human Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
2Department of Practice and Policy, UCL School of Pharmacy, University
College London, BMA House, Entrance A, Tavistock Square, Bloomsbury,
London WC1H 9JP, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Lichtner et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making          (2020) 20:193 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12911-020-01212-z
(Continued from previous page)
Conclusions: Within oncology, CPOE appears to move the ‘mix’ of risk strategies towards ultra-safe models of
safety and protocol-mandated care. However, in order to operate ultra-safe strategies embedded in CPOE and stay
on protocol it is essential for clinicians to be thoughtful and show sensitivity to operations in CPOE use. CPOE
design can be advanced by better consideration of mechanisms to support interdependencies.
Keywords: Health information technology, Evaluation, Medication safety, System safety, Paediatrics, Hospitals,
Human factors, Qualitative research
Background
Chemotherapy medications are hazardous, high risk
treatments; errors with these medications can cause se-
vere harm, especially in children [1]. Chemotherapy regi-
mens are administered often in combination with other
medications and over many months, and errors are often
associated with interdependent elements of chemother-
apy regimens, such as number of cycles, dose scheduling,
cumulative doses, and monitoring [1, 2].
To reduce harm from chemotherapy, risk management
strategies must be in place [3], individual patient regi-
mens must be based on documented and referenced
protocols [4], and work processes organised with refer-
ence to accepted standards [4–7] and designed to reduce
the possibility of error [8, 9]. Computerized provider
order entry (CPOE) systems with decision support are a
further strategy for improving safety with chemotherapy.
CPOE can reduce medication errors and unwanted
protocol deviations by automatically calculating chemo-
therapy doses based on patient height and weight, pro-
viding warnings, assisting in scheduling of chemotherapy
cycles, and supporting workflow [10–16]. Conversely,
CPOE can introduce new types of error and have unex-
pected negative consequences on work practices [1, 17].
It can also be challenging to implement CPOE for
chemotherapy [15, 16, 18, 19], with every chemotherapy
protocol having to be entered in the system and then
kept up to date [15, 20]. Adoption of CPOE for chemo-
therapy can thus lag behind adoption of CPOE systems
for other medications or in other clinical areas [15].
The literature suggests that design of CPOE for
chemotherapy is ‘confronted with problems’ [21] and
that CPOE alone is not sufficient to eliminate chemo-
therapy errors. Other safety strategies generally co-exist,
including error surveillance systems [22, 23], checking of
patient regimens against standard protocols [22, 24], and
interventions to improve situational awareness [12, 22].
The literature remains unclear on how CPOE relates to
such strategies, especially with regard to management of
interdependencies. This gap in knowledge may hinder
efforts to improve CPOE design and implementation,
and thus improve patient safety.
This study aimed to fill this gap by investigating how
CPOE for chemotherapy relates to other safety strategies
in use in a paediatric clinical oncology unit, with a focus
on the management of interdependencies. Our objectives
were to identify the strategies clinicians apply to safely
manage the interdependencies inherent in paediatric
chemotherapy, and whether/how CPOE affects these.
For this study, we drew on theoretical and practical in-
sights from Vincent and Amalberti’s research on safety
strategies ‘in the real world’, and the three main safety
models they propose - ultra-safe, high-reliability organi-
sations (HROs) and ultra-adaptive [3, 25, 26]. We briefly
explain their framework in the next section, as we de-
scribe our methods and provide definitions.
Methods
Analytical framework
Vincent and Amalberti [3] explain the different ‘real
world’ safety strategies applied in different sectors or or-
ganisations for dealing with risks. Such strategies may
involve, for example: 1. eliminating exposure to risk by
defining ‘no go’ contexts for operations (following Amal-
berti, we refer to this as ‘Plan A’ [25] – in aviation,
equivalent to grounding all flights when a volcano
erupts) and applying rigid standard operating proce-
dures; 2. introducing barriers to risks by engineering op-
timisation of work processes (including by introducing
technology); 3. dealing with risks by improving organisa-
tional capacity for monitoring, adaptation and response
(e.g. by maintaining ‘sensitivity to operations’ [27], or
awareness of how one’s actions affect others); and 4. de-
veloping professional expertise for extreme situations.
We considered these strategies as different ways, at dif-
ferent levels, to manage risks associated with inter-
dependencies. These strategies also approximately
correspond to three models of safety in organisations
(Fig. 1)– the ultra-safe (examples 1 and 2 above), high
reliability organisation (HRO) (example 3) and ultra-
adaptive (example 4) [3, 25]. Different healthcare con-
texts have a different combination of the three models,
with some working more often than others as ultra-safe,
HRO, and/or ultra-adaptive, along a continuum. Thus, it
may be expected that: ‘A healthcare team might, in one
afternoon, work in an ultra-safe manner at some points,
such as when a care pathway is clearly defined and en-
tirely appropriate for the patient; they may work in a
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high-reliability mode for the main part and, for short pe-
riods, in an ultra-adaptive mode.’ [3]
Building on Thompson’s Organization in Action [28],
we define interdependency as the relation between tasks or
activities, where related tasks/activities must all be com-
pleted in a timely fashion, reliably, and/or safely, to
achieve safe processes and/or outcomes. While many
interdependencies are sequential (one task contributing to
the next; a task cannot be completed unless other tasks
have been completed first), others may be reciprocal (one
task contributing to the other and vice-versa), or pooled
(each activity independently contributing to the whole)
[28]. For example, nurses’ chemotherapy administration
depends on doctors’ prescribing, which may depend on
pathologists’ reporting results (sequential tasks); supplying
medications in hospital pharmacies on a just-in-case basis,
contributes to doctors prescribing medications to patients,
while doctors prescribing also calls for medications being
stored in pharmacy on a just-in-case basis (reciprocal rela-
tionship between activities); repeated administration of
chemotherapy doses to a patient cumulates towards a safe
maximum level (pooled activities). We define time de-
pendencies as those where safety in management of the
interdependency requires attention to timeliness or timing
of related tasks (e.g. administration of sequential doses at
specific time intervals).
Fig. 1 Three models of safety and examples of associated risk strategies. Elaboration of Vincent and Amalberti text and figures [3, 25], with
additional reference to collective mindfulness – typical of high reliability organisations models of safety [27]. Collective mindfulness manifests when
people on the frontline collectively show preoccupation with failure (ongoing wariness that errors are possible), reluctance to simplify interpretations of
unexpected events (questioning assumptions, uncovering blind spots), sensitivity to operations (having an integrated understanding of current situation,
e.g. awareness of how one’s actions affect others), commitment to resilience (awareness that it is impossible to anticipate all situations, needs for
adaptation) and deference to expertise (persons with expertise to make decisions regardless of hierarchy) [27]
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Setting and design
The study took place in the oncology unit of a 350-bed
tertiary paediatric hospital in New South Wales
(Australia) between September 2018 and June 2019. The
oncology unit is the largest children’s cancer unit in the
State, with up to 150 new referrals each year. The unit
has an inpatient ward plus an outpatient clinic run as an
‘open door’ service where patients and their families can
be seen without an appointment. Doctors are routinely
called to see patients not under their regular care.
Eighteen months prior to this study, the hospital had
implemented hospital-wide CPOE (Cerner [29]) for pre-
scribing and administration of medications, test orders
and results, as part of an electronic medical record sys-
tem. The oncology unit made use of CPOE functionality
for linking orders (‘PowerPlan’) to incorporate chemo-
therapy regimens into the system and to prescribe and
administer chemotherapy for individual patients. A
chemotherapy PowerPlan team was responsible for
building chemotherapy protocol templates in the CPOE
and training oncology clinicians in use of the system.
We carried out a qualitative, interpretative study com-
bining incident report analysis and interviews. Analysis
of the incident reports informed the interview questions,
and the insights gained through the interviews fed back
to further analysis of the events described in the incident
reports.
Data collection
Incident reports were submitted by staff through the
hospital online incident reporting system. Any event that
resulted in (or had potential to lead to) injury, damage
or other loss is required to be reported. The hospital
provided us with all incident reports concerning oncol-
ogy patients recorded in the period 15 August 2016 to
15 February 2018 (the first 18 months following CPOE
implementation in oncology), whether or not these were
specifically related to medications or CPOE.
Interviews were carried out by a researcher (VL) with
a background in health informatics and qualitative re-
search. All clinicians in the oncology unit and members
of the chemotherapy PowerPlan team were invited to
participate as we were seeking to maximise variety of
levels of seniority and CPOE expertise. Access to partici-
pants was facilitated by the unit coordinator. We sought
participants for interviews until we reached code and
meaning saturation [30]. Interviews were semi-
structured, using questions (Additional file 1) aimed to
uncover how clinicians deal with interdependencies in
the medication process, and whether the CPOE sup-
ported their work. With participants’ written consent,
interviews were audio recorded and professionally
transcribed.
Data analysis
We carried out a qualitative content analysis [31] of the
text narratives of the incident reports (fields for Incident
description and Contributing factors) and the interview
transcripts. Analysis was carried out with support of
NVivo v.11, by one researcher in discussion with co-
investigators. The free text fields from incident reports
were treated as narrative accounts of events from front-
line clinicians [32, 33]. All reports were included, but
only those related to direct patient care coded. We took
both a conventional (inductive) content analysis ap-
proach, with open codes derived from the data, and a di-
rected (deductive) approach with our objectives
providing higher level categories for grouping the open
codes.
Analysis of interview transcripts was carried out itera-
tively. First, an in-depth detailed understanding of the
data was gained through careful reading and line by line
coding. Open codes were applied through both conven-
tional and directed approaches, to address study objec-
tives and capture significant aspects of the context.
Chemotherapy medication processes, as described by cli-
nicians in the unit, were represented in flowcharts to
better understand interdependencies in workflow. This
analysis was done concurrently with, and soon after, data
collection. A framework analysis approach [34] was then
applied using categories from Vincent and Amalberti’s
model.
Throughout the analysis process, discrepant findings
were sought. Findings from incident analysis were trian-
gulated with those from interviews to enrich under-
standing [35]. The head of the oncology unit (LDP)
checked ‘the “fit” between respondents’ views and the re-
searcher’s representation of them’ [36] (credibility).
Results
A dataset of 827 incidents were received from the hos-
pital and included in the analysis. Incidents not concern-
ing direct patient care were then excluded (n = 73).
(Details of the 827 incidents are given in Additional file 2
and elsewhere [37]). In the analysis of the incidents, the
CPOE appeared to be both a mechanism for safety and a
contributing factor for incidents.
Twenty interviews were conducted with 19 partici-
pants (Table 1). Interviews lasted about 30 min.
We integrated results from interviews and incidents
analysis and structured these around interdependencies
and risks to medication safety, strategies to deal with
these risks, and the role of the CPOE for each strategy.
We identified quotes from interview transcripts by inter-
view number (idX), but do not provide details on inter-
viewees’ roles to protect their anonymity. We refer to
incident reports by their row in the dataset (iX).
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Interdependencies and risks to safety with chemotherapy
Work practices related to paediatric chemotherapy treat-
ments were rich in interdependencies. Across interviews
and incidents, we identified two interrelated overarching
types of interdependencies that characterised chemo-
therapy prescribing and administration: first, those re-
lated to the organisation of clinical activities, in
particular the medication workflow involving doctors,
nurses and pharmacy staff, and its interplay with a var-
iety of hospital services (e.g. intensive care, pathology,
imaging, as well as other hospitals), and second, inter-
dependencies inherent to chemotherapy regimens that
dictated combinations of medications and tests. Time
dependencies were especially apparent, such as precise
time gaps between administration of successive doses.
Both types of interdependencies (organisational and
regimen-related) were identified in incident reports and
often involved CPOE. For example, an incorrect date in
a CPOE prescription and a delay in documentation of
the patient being ‘ready for chemotherapy’ (organisa-
tional dependency-medication workflow) delayed admin-
istration due to the medication requiring pre-medication
(a regimen dependency), which further cascaded into re-
quiring monitoring of the patient ‘after hours’, leading to
increased risks for the patient and costs to the hospital
(organisational dependency).
[...] Patient due rituximab and MTX [methotrexate]
today, date for chemotherapy was incorrect and not
‘ready for chemotherapy’ documented [in the CPOE].
This delayed chemotherapy administration until
11am. [...] [medications] will need to be reordered.
The first medication requires premedication and the
patient is at risk of anaphylaxis with this drug
(needs to be given in business hours) and MTX re-
quires blood monitoring levels and if given outside
set hours adds significant cost [...] [i150]
Ultra-safe risk strategies applied to chemotherapy
processes
Chemotherapy safety risks were reported to be managed
through a range of strategies based on the application of
rules and multiple safety checks. These appeared more
typical of the ultra-safe model of safety [3] than the HRO
model.
Specifically, participants spoke of rigid rules regarding
who was authorised to prescribe chemotherapy (on
CPOE) and the content of medication orders as per
chemotherapy protocols. Continuing with a regimen (e.g.
progressing to the next cycle) was organised around the
principle of withholding treatment until the patient re-
covers (comparable to ‘Plan A’ in the ultra-safe model).
Participants reported multiple checks during the medi-
cation process. In particular, nurses were tasked with
checking each dose against the protocol to alert doctors
to any discrepancy. This was ‘an institution specific prac-
tice’ (id16) that was maintained after CPOE implementa-
tion, despite the use of pre-set CPOE templates that
would (or should) support doctors to produce orders
matching the corresponding protocol.
...when I am ordering it [on CPOE], it looks fine to
me. [But] The nurses [would] say, “Well, can’t do
that because it is out of sequence,” or, “you have
pushed this onto that.” [...] Or they will say, “The
protocol mandates 120% of this and you are giving
110% or 150%.” And they are just simply saying, “Is
this what you want me to do?” ... (id16)
Sometimes the patient’s condition led to clinicians de-
ciding to deviate from the protocol – such as when ‘this
child has such a high-risk disease that no matter what
I’m going to go ahead’ (id16) despite test results not
reaching the threshold indicated by the protocol. This
kind of judgement – highly dependent on individual
clinical expertise - typically belongs to the ultra-adaptive
model of safety. However, in this context – where the
doctor had to communicate the decision to the nurses
and to other doctors in order to act on it – it is perhaps
suggestive of a HRO approach to dealing with risks.
Does CPOE support an ultra-safe model of safety with
chemotherapy?
CPOE supported strategies typical of the ultra-safe
model through hard and soft mechanisms, namely
through automation, access to information and stand-
ardisation of the semantics of protocols (disambiguation)
(Table 2).
Table 1 Interview participants
Role n
Consultant oncologists a 2
Fellows 4
Registrars 3
Senior resident medical officer 1
Specialist pharmacist 1
Nurse unit manager b 1
Registered nurses b 4
Clinical nurse consultant 1
Information technology team - oncology pharmacist background 1
Information technology team - oncology nurse background 1
Total 19
a one interviewed twice; b within the same group interview. Paediatric
oncology fellows and registrars in New South Wales (Australia), are resident
doctors with oncology as their speciality, considered ‘consultants in waiting’
and ‘consultants in training’ respectively. This notation may be
different internationally
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In terms of automation, the CPOE provided clinicians
with all required medications pre-built in templates, to
reduce the possibility of medications being omitted by
mistake, which were also linked with appropriate time
dependencies (if doctors delayed one, the others would
be automatically delayed for a corresponding period).
The CPOE provided automatic dose calculations and
warnings based on embedded rules, and ‘exposed’ unreli-
able patient weight and height data used for dose calcu-
lation, by displaying trends and normal ranges.
... you can see patients with a weight here and a
height up here [on the CPOE chart] [...] three months
for a baby of four kilos you can go to eight kilos, you
can change dramatically the dose. [...]. Now, in
paper land [...] [doctors] might go six months with-
out checking the height and weight. It happened be-
fore, but here it’s exposing it. (id1)
CPOE automation also limited prescribing and admin-
istration rights through different users’ profiles; the em-
bedded workflow management system automatically
routed the orders to the authorised person. The CPOE
paused the workflow proceeding forward to administra-
tion until the system had been notified via a checkbox
that the patient was ‘ready for chemo’.
However, these CPOE contributions towards an ultra-
safe approach to chemotherapy were challenged by the
Table 2 Ultra-safe strategies to avoid medication errors/unwanted protocols’ variations: automation and ‘soft’ support
Risk strategy (ultra-safe model) CPOE support Examples from the data of how the CPOE supports the use
of ultra-safe strategies (compared to paper-based systems)
Treatment is independent of
specific clinicians
Visibility and access to protocol rules
and a patient prescribed treatment
[...] your treatment has to go ahead whether I’m alive, dead,
overseas [...] someone else has to bear the brunt of knowing
where they’re at. So it’s really crucial for us to have a system
whereby the – ‘where they’re at’ is easily accessible, (id1)
Everyone knows/has access to
the rules
Visibility and access to protocol rules
and a patient prescribed treatment
...we have got immediate access to what the protocol looks like
and [...] to the documentation. [...] they’re not squirreled away in some
cupboard, they’re not lost, they’re available electronic everywhere. (id1)
[nurses would] go to the orders page. [...] And they’ll go okay, so he’s in
hospital [...], so he came in on Sunday, tomorrow he’s due vincristine. I
have to make sure I check with the doctors, whether they want him to
go ahead with it or delay it, which they would never have known in
advance, previously. They’d never have been able to see that. Because
they didn’t have any of their chemotherapy records when they got
admitted. [...] Their visibility of it is probably one of the most important
things of the plans. (id14)
Standardised protocols across
patients and clinicians
Disambiguation of protocol rules … whether an or and a comma in a sentence meant one thing was
inclusive of another, or one thing was exclusive of another. So even
within protocols, even the smallest wording, [...] you’ve really got to
sit down and discuss as a team what you think it means, … (id13)
Rules on the content of the
prescription (as per protocol)




Warnings about breaking rules
...depending on the drugs that go into [the CPOE plans] and how they
relate to each other [...] they might [...] have a timed relationship to say
you’re not allowed to start drug Y until drug X has finished or run them
both at the same time... (id13)
You’re meant to give this over four hours, [...] - in paper, that was just
written and then pharmacy would come along and, kind of, annotate it,
whereas now it’s prebuilt ... (id7)
all the drugs listed here, you just have to agree to it [...] [the CPOE system]
will limit dose, [system says two] you can’t order two and a half. So there
are certain protections in the system... (id1)
Rules on who can act on
the prescription
Users’ profiles and workflow
management systems to route
the prescription
... [the fellows] – they can sign it but it doesn’t go to pharmacy until it’s
[gone] to the oncologist. [...] Once [the oncologist] reviewed it, it goes to
pharmacy. [...] [Pharmacy] can’t make it up until [it’s been reviewed by
the oncologist]. (id1)
Treatment stopped until
patient recovers [‘Plan A’]
‘Ready for chemo’ checkbox –
no administration until ‘ticked’
...there is a flow that says, well say it’s more than 30 white cells, [...],
liver function is less than that, [...] very clear criteria and then only if
you tick them and if they are okay will it allow you to go ahead and
sign for a go ahead. (id2)
Checks along the process Double signatures required to
unlock next step
...we are much more rigid in terms of two people checking, two people
going to the bedside. (id8–12)
Checks against the rules Nurses verifying treatment based
on access to the protocol
... [before CPOE] you had to have the paper protocol [...] [with the CPOE]
the nurses [...] [have] access to the protocol. So, when they saw a particular
dose scheduled, they would go to the protocol, check it and say ‘yes’. And,
[...] if it didn’t marry, then they would report it as an incident ... (id16)
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perceived complexity of operating the system (especially
when protocol templates were not available in the sys-
tem to prescribe a patient’s regimen), and difficulties in
identifying ‘where the patient is at’ in the protocol.
In terms of ‘soft’ mechanisms, we identified two as-
pects of CPOE that supported use of ultra-safe risk strat-
egies. All clinicians had access both to patient
information and the relevant chemotherapy protocol;
previously, paper-based protocols were kept in drawers
and not easily accessible across place and time. In
addition, the process of converting paper-based proto-
cols into electronic versions brought to the surface pre-
viously invisible ambiguities in their rules. To automate
these rules, these had to be clarified and uniquely de-
fined so that all clinicians would interpret the protocol
in the same way.
HRO strategies - management of uncertainties and ‘usual
hazards’ through adaptation and different time horizons
The application of the principle of withholding treat-
ment until the patient recovers (‘plan A’) meant that
planned doses or cycles often needed to be rescheduled.
Thus, for any patient there would be uncertainty about
when exactly the treatment would be given. This sched-
uling – or rescheduling - of the treatment must also take
into account the constraints posed by the hospital’s re-
sources (organisational interdependencies), for example
‘our general anaesthetic days are Monday and Thursday’
(id16), or over holidays, ‘services aren’t working quite as
well’ (id1). The patient and family may also pose con-
straints on suitable dates – such as wanting to avoid
school photo day.
Clinicians reported that it was challenging to plan cy-
cles, tests and doses much in advance. Although the
CPOE theoretically allowed clinicians to prescribe a
whole regimen in advance, given these uncertainties, in-
terviewees indicated that they would only schedule about
a month ahead in practice.
Researcher: the doctors might schedule the entire one
year of treatment in advance? Participant: [...] they
probably wouldn’t. [...] we would chart chemother-
apy, kind of, a month out, because [children] can
grow so much in such a short time, the doses need to
change. Other things can happen as well that they
may start to not recover as well, so we need to mod-
ify the dose, it was too big for them, so we need to
back off [...]. (id7)
Doctors therefore made use of time as a risk manage-
ment strategy [25] to deal with the uncertainties. More
specifically, we identified three time horizons used to ap-
proach a patient’s chemotherapy regimen – a life-long
view, the whole regimen view, and the ‘here and now’.
CPOE automation better supported the ‘here and now’
than the longer time views (Table 3). For example, clini-
cians reported difficulties with finding and collating in-
formation to calculate a patient cumulative dose (a life-
long view), and with the fragmented electronic display of
the whole regimen.
Sensitivity to operations and CPOE
We found that a combination of situation awareness, or-
ganisational awareness and CPOE awareness was per-
ceived as essential for safe and efficient CPOE use
(Fig. 2). Clinicians had to maintain (and act on) situ-
ational awareness to understand ‘where is the patient at’
in their specific regimen and with respect to the corre-
sponding protocol. Several interviewees referred to this
information need – ‘where patients are up to’ (id1, id5,
id7, id8–12). Clinicians also had to maintain (and act
on) organisational awareness. For example, they had to
act on the system with awareness of self and others
‘down the line’ (Table 4). They had to be aware of
CPOE, learning to be watchful of its automated behav-
iour such as automated recording of times and dates.
With use, clinicians learned that, for a variety of reasons,
time and dates in the system may not accurately reflect
the times when medication activities took place. This
had repercussions for regimen time dependencies, which
were also encoded in the templates.
...sometimes when [the CPOE] says, it’s the start
date, it’s not really been the start date, because it’s
been delayed [...]. That stays as the estimated start
date [...] when you come to [prescribe], they’re due
next week, for example, but if you look at the chemo-
therapy, [...], they’re due in two weeks. [...] just [auto-
matically] ticks over [...] (id3)
Discussion
We studied a paediatric oncology unit using a hospital-
wide CPOE system, and identified two inter-related
overarching types of interdependencies associated with
chemotherapy: those related to the organisation of clin-
ical activities, and those inherent to chemotherapy regi-
mens in terms of dictating precise combinations of
medications, and combinations of medications and tests.
Time dependencies were especially apparent across both
interdependency types. The time dependencies in a pa-
tient regimen were dealt with through a cognitive strat-
egy known as ‘fragmentation’ (‘allowing shorter horizon
planning’ [39]) and a practice of temporary plans and
constant adjustments. These we associate with ‘adapta-
tion’ strategies typical of HRO models of safety.
CPOE automation seemed to better support the small
scale, short-time regimen dependencies that are largely
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under control of the team, rather than the scheduling of
services where organisational dependencies are not
under their control. It is possible that the small scale,
short-time regimen dependencies were mainly sequential
interdependencies (e.g. administration of different medi-
cations as sequential steps), while the organisational de-
pendencies were also relational or pooled, and that
sequential interdependencies are easier to automate in
workflow management systems.
Both ultra-safe and HRO strategies were used to ad-
dress chemotherapy risks and interdependencies. CPOE
automation supported application of ultra-safe strategies
in chemotherapy such as compliance with protocols’
rules and ‘no-go’ contexts for proceeding with chemo-
therapy. CPOE support mechanisms for an ultra-safe
model of care were both ‘hard’ (automation) and ‘soft’
(information availability/disambiguation). However, pre-
scribing regimens with CPOE was difficult when proto-
col templates were not readily available; it was difficult
to track medication data across screens, and a summary
display of the whole regimen (showing protocol varia-
tions, if any) was not available; automated time-stamps
of medication administration were not always accurate,
with repercussions for subsequent time-dependent
doses. Therefore, in addition to situational awareness at
the level of the patient [38] and awareness of the organi-
sation’s teams and services [27], clinicians had to main-
tain awareness of the technology (‘CPOE awareness’), its
limitations and consequences. We propose a definition
of CPOE awareness as knowledge of how the technology
works, how to make it work, and the effects it produces,
and acting on this knowledge.
Table 3 Doctors’ time horizons over chemotherapy treatments and computerised provider order entry (CPOE) support
Time horizona Uncertainty and/or risks associated
with interdependencies managed
with this time horizon
Examples of how CPOE supports
this (or not)*
Examples from the data
life-long A view over cumulative effects
of medications over time, to
manage life-long risks (e.g. hearth
failure)
Compared to paper-based records,
CPOE makes patient information
available, independent of time and
place
(*) Difficulty in tracing specific data
across different orders/screens
(*) IT teams can manually build into
the system automated alerts on
cumulative doses – but this must be
done for each drug, and may not be
available when needed
...the cardiologist team always need to
know how much anthracyclines they’ve
received, because it’s cardiotoxic and the
dose that they’ve received makes a
difference about what was risk stratifying
and things. So to try and find a patient’s
cumulative anthracycline dose sometimes
has been exhausting. More exhausting
than night shifts exhausting. (id20)
whole treatment A view over ‘where we are at’ in the
protocol as a whole; how the
protocol is being given – possibly
adapted – to the patient, and the
patient response to treatment. It is
a view of how much chemotherapy
overall is needed, to minimise
toxicity and maximise effect, and
how it is given over time
Compared to paper-based records,
CPOE makes patient information
available, independent of time and
place
(*) Lack of a summary overview/
graphic display of the whole regimen
with any variations of protocols applied
to the patient in the past and planned
future doses
(*) Information is available but very
detailed and fragmented
I can go through a three-day admission,
it’s all there in a capsule. But when that
becomes 6 months or 12 months or
5 years, ... the system is not geared to
allow us to navigate to the critical
information [...] The treatment is listed
as a series of lines [...] it’s very hard to
actually visualise that they haven’t got
an extra dose at day 15 or they’ve
missed a dose at day seven, ... (id6)
here and now A view over the requirements and
constraints for the administration
of the current dose, to prevent
medication errors, unwanted
deviations from protocols, and
delays
Automated pre-coded prescription
items, time dependencies and
scheduling, all items included in
the prescription at planning stage
...the main thing is the system is built on
protocol. [...] it follows almost exactly the
way the protocol is written, almost all the
time. And if in case what I am prescribing
is a deviation from what is allowed, then [...]
it is going to flag up. For example, if something
that I needed to be charted for day 1, I charted
again for day 2 and 3 [..], then it will say, it’s
already there why are you [ordering] it? [...]
and it’s really handy that [...] the cut offs
[safety thresholds] are already there, right next
to that. (id2)
the timing [...] often it’s pre-suggested as well,
depending on what medication you’re charting
it will already have a suggested frequency that
you should be charting it (d5)
a Over a life-long view, there are concerns for life-long risks of cumulative doses. A whole treatment view is required for most treatment decisions; each dose is
assessed in view of patient’s response to previous doses, in relation to future doses, future options for treatment - at any point in time, the sensemaking is
retrospective and prospective. The view over the here and now is concerned with ‘the minutiae’ of the medication process related to the specific dose, around the
time of administration. It’s where the order is finalised, multiple checks performed, medications given (or not) – a time that may span over a few days
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The finding that ‘CPOE awareness’ was needed in this
setting is consistent with other CPOE chemotherapy
implementations that required significant investment of
time and resources to enable clinicians to gain necessary
familiarity with all the nuances of CPOE workflows [19].
Our finding that CPOE automation supported applica-
tion of ultra-safe strategies in chemotherapy is in line
with existing literature that shows how CPOE may im-
prove compliance with chemotherapy protocols [17].
However, prescribed regimens are subject to change and
in need of adaptation, also due to application of ultra-
safe rules (typically, waiting for patient recovery before
proceeding with treatment). In the late 1990s, medical
sociologists Timmermans and Berg explained how
standardisation of patient care with (paper-based) oncol-
ogy protocols was achieved through clinicians’ ‘active
(not mindless) support [...] to maintain the protocol’s
trajectory on course’ [40]. In their account, adaptation
was an enabler, rather than opposer, to standardisation.
We posit that active (not mindless) adaptation requires
situational awareness (knowledge of ‘where is the patient
at’ in relation to a prescribed regimen and underlying
protocol), which must be facilitated by CPOE displaying
interdependent elements of regimens over different time
horizons (in chemotherapy, known as ‘roadmaps’ [12]).
This is also supported by recent research suggesting that
chemotherapy errors with CPOE may be prevented with
knowledge of a patient’s chemotherapy history and in-
depth knowledge of protocols [41]. Nurses’ and/or phar-
macists’ routine checks of CPOE orders against proto-
cols [22, 24] – also reported in the unit we studied - are
one way to address CPOE limitations by automatically
monitoring variations to protocols, and may also be fa-
cilitated by the availability of electronic roadmap
displays.
Strengths of this study include multiple sources of data
- interviews and incident reports - and analysis informed
by theory. A limitation is that we did not observe the ac-
tivities described. Instead, we relied on participants as
‘their own ethnographers’ [42]. We had limited nurse
participation. We identified ultra-safe and HRO strat-
egies; we did not find any strategy from the ultra-
adaptive safety model possibly because we did not ob-
serve activities. Patient safety incident reports were brief
and provided only limited information; incidents related
to multiple aspects of patient care, not exclusively
chemotherapy. We took a qualitative approach to inci-
dent analysis given the limitations of analysing these
quantitatively; reported incidents are likely to represent
only a fraction of the incidents that occur and thus num-
bers of incidents cannot be relied on to establish fre-
quency [43]. The CPOE system investigated was a
general system adapted for chemotherapy, rather than a
bespoke chemotherapy system; it is not known whether
the findings generalise across other organisations and
other systems.
Fig. 2 Sensitivity to operations in chemotherapy prescribing (with examples). CPOE = Computerized Provider Order Entry system. We refer to
Endsley’s definition of situation awareness [38] as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”, applied to a patient. With organisation awareness we refer
to the understanding of how roles and services fit within the organisational structure, institutional practices and rules, and how to operate within
these practices to achieve desired effects. This definition includes individual awareness of local teams and workflows, or of the wider hospital
organisation, within or beyond individual’s control. CPOE awareness is knowledge on how the technology works/how to make it work/the effects
it produces and acting on this knowledge. We take sensitivity to operations (at individual or collective level) as any and all of the three types of
awareness at any one time
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Ultra-safe services ‘are highly standardized and rely
heavily on automation and information technology’ [3].
Implementation of CPOE in chemotherapy appears to
be a move towards ultra-safe, but our findings suggest
that CPOE design must be improved. In such a complex
and high-risk setting, CPOE design should facilitate
clinicians’ decision-making processes, rather than add
difficulties. Lessons can be learned for design of chemo-
therapy CPOE that better supports the management of
interdependencies in regimens and workflows [21]. This
might include affording a variety of visualisation displays
over different time horizons and capturing more
Table 4 Examples of (organisation) team level awareness and computerised provider order entry (CPOE) limitations
Team perspective CPOE issue to be aware of Examples from the data of awareness of the impact
of the CPOE for the team
Doctors with doctors Difficult to identify ‘where the patient is
at’ [whole regimen view]
....you do have to then plough through a fair bit of
information to figure out where they’re at. So I’m at
the mercy of the quality of the input of the previous
doctor [...] If they put in [...] for example, “had day 72
coming on the 14th [of this month] for day 86,” then
it places me exactly where they’re at. [...] if they put
that in it makes my life easy. If they put in, “See again
next scheduled visit”, I don’t know what that next
scheduled visit is. And for my patients I might know,
[...] I will see other people’s patients [...] I have to then
come up to speed with what that particular patient
is on. (id1)
Difficult to identify [patient specific]
changes to prescriptions
I know the things that make my life easier, so I will
document these things whenever I see them. And
some of the fellows that see them in clinic, because
they were more recently registrars and recognise this
issue, will do the same. So they will document clearly
their medication list, and the changes that they’ve
made. (id20)
Doctors with nurses Difficult to identify ‘where the patient
is at’ [exact place in the protocol (a PDF file)]
Nurse 1: [...] when the fellows are ordering the chemo [...]
it does help if they are actually very specific on where this
kid is up to, like, exactly what cycle and everything they
are up to.
Nurse 2: ‘Course two, cycle three, page 59’.
Nurse 1: The more specific they [doctors] are,
the easier it is
for us to find it, yeah. (id8–12)
Automatically calculated doses may not
be feasible to administer
[as a doctor] I make sure that the dose isn’t something
that’s ridiculous and going to be really hard for [nurses]
to give. (id5)
Automatically calculated times of doses
may not be convenient (safe?)
I make sure that [nurses] can recognise if they need to
give it now or if they can give it at a later date, like [...]
the midnight doses. [...] whether the times that are
coming up are convenient. (id5)
Fluid charts may not get automatically
filled-in
... just things like being aware that if they [the doctors]
don’t fill out things like durations and infuse over times
correctly, it makes it much harder for the nurses to then
complete their fluid balance charts correctly, because
they’ve got to manually pull everything in, whereas if
the doctors order it correctly it all prepopulates beautifully f
or them. (id13)
Nurses with nurses Difficult to identify ‘where the patient is at’
[exact place in the protocol (a PDF file)]
Nurse 1: To find the bit you actually want for the
chemo you are giving, you might have to scroll
through multiple pages if you are the first [nurse]
to kind of ... find that cycle of chemo.
Nurse 2: Once you found it we write it down [for the next
nurse]. (id8–12)
Doctors with Pharmacy Automatically calculated doses may
not be feasible to dispense
So not prescribing a dose that’s 1.62 mg because no
pharmacist is ever going to be able to draw that
up ... (id13)
Pharmacy staff access to CPOE orders
not sufficient for timely dispensing
We owe it to the pharmacy to give them as much notice as
possible and the minimum [lead] time we have most recently
put in is 48 h. So the pharmacy has to know at least 48 h
before, we’re going to give the drug... (id2)
Lichtner et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making          (2020) 20:193 Page 10 of 12
accurate timestamps of activities, tracking protocol
variations and cumulative effects over time. CPOE
implementations also need to support learning pro-
cesses for clinicians to gain the awareness needed to
use CPOE systems safely. For this, sufficient enabling
resources (e.g. staff/patient ratio, CPOE training and
assistance, quiet time for prescribing) must be in
place at the point of roll-out and maintained through-
out staff turnover [19].
To our knowledge, this is the first study to apply Vin-
cent and Amalberti’s models of safety and related risk
strategies [3] to evaluate a technology implementation in
a healthcare setting. The study has been able to identify
mechanisms by which CPOEs can mitigate or exacerbate
medication safety risks.
Patients and families may have different priorities or
values about medication safety and compliance with
rules, that may vary during the long period of chemo-
therapy treatments. Future research in paediatric oncol-
ogy should investigate whether/how patients and
families’ priorities or values change the way clinicians
use the CPOE for chemotherapy regimens, and how they
approach the different time frames: the ‘here and now’,
‘whole treatment’ and ‘life-long’. Further research with
CPOE for chemotherapy should also investigate time de-
pendencies in regimens in more detail – including how
nurses manage administration times between doses and
automated timestamping of activities.
Conclusions
CPOE appears to affect the ‘mix’ of risk strategies in
place in an oncology unit. It can drive ultra-safe models
of safety and protocol mandated care, but operating
ultra-safe strategies embedded in the CPOE and staying
on protocol also requires HRO strategies including ‘sen-
sitivity to operations’ in CPOE use. CPOE implementa-
tions need to support the processes of learning required
for clinicians to gain such collective awareness, and
shortcomings in CPOE design must be addressed for it
to fully contribute to the ultra-safe.
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